allocates permits based on …rms'absolute performance (APM), as used by Böhringer and Lange (2005) , is a special case of a generalized relative performance mechanism (RPM), and thus that the two mechanisms share a number of optimality properties in a dynamic setting. We however argue that mechanisms which are based on relative performance might be superior over those based on absolute performance and o¤er a promising alternative to auctioning and grandfathering, namely a rank-order contest.
Both types of mechanisms have had important applications in existing tradable permit markets. Absolute performance mechanisms have been advocated in the form of relative emissions or intensity-based emissions caps (Fischer 2001; Ellerman and Wing, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Kuik and Mulder, 2004; Pizer, 2005; Newell and Pizer, 2006) . 1 In such a scheme intra-…rm relative comparisons exist, where the performance of a given …rm is evaluated relative to its own activity, but not relative to the activity of other …rms. Rather than having a cap on absolute levels of emissions, an intensity-based cap involves a ceiling on the emissions intensity (i.e. emissions per one unit of output). This type of approach is becoming increasingly common, for example, Bode (2005) notes that a number of participants in the UK emissions trading scheme were given an intensity target. Furthermore, the Bush administration in the U.S. has strongly advocated this type of approach to tackle climate change (Kolstad, 2005; Pizer, 2005) . When a trading system is based on emissions intensity, each …rm can unilaterally increase both their output and emissions without changing emissions intensity and without any e¤ect on other …rms (the permit allocation is an adjustable grandfathering mechanism). However, the majority of distribution rules which have been discussed are relative performance mechanisms. The two most common RPMs include auctions (where …rms' are allocated permits based on their relative bids) and grandfathering with a …xed cap (where …rms' are allocated permits based on their relative emissions levels with respect to some …xed cap) (see Hahn and Noll, 1982; Lyon, 1984; Oehmke, 1987; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Van Dyke, 1991; Franciosi et al., 1993; Parry, 1995; Parry et al., 1999; Cramton and Kerr, 2002) . However, there is a large selection of RPMs that have not been extensively considered in the literature. For example, yardstick competition, where each …rm's performance is assessed relatively to the performance of other …rms has been suggested (Shleifer, 1985; Franckx et al., 2005; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b) . Moreover, a novel RPM that could be envisaged to allocate permits is the use of contests or tournaments where …rms spend resources in order to 'win'a proportion of the permit allocation (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; 2006) .
Inter-…rm comparisons using relative performance mechanisms have a number of general regulatory advantages which have been widely documented in the literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holmström, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b; Mookherjee, 1984; Shleifer, 1985; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; 2006) . Relative performance mechanisms can also be advantageous in an environmental context. Govindasamy et al. (1994) suggested the use of a tournament to control nonpoint pollution, and found that a RPM results in a number of desirable outcomes. Franckx et al. (2005) extended the work of Govindasamy et al. (1994) by using a di¤erent RPM, yardstick competition, and conducted the analysis in a more general environmental regulatory setting. They …nd that this RPM will be desirable when a large number of …rms participate and common shocks (such as similar technology shocks or oil price changes) are experienced by all …rms.
Rather fewer authors have focused on relative performance issues in emissions trading. Using a rent-seeking model, Malueg and Yates (2006) examine the e¤ects of citizen participation in a permit market to determine the endowment and price of permits.
They …nd that citizens'choice of lobbying and permit purchases in a market depends on the initial allocation mechanism chosen (auctioning or grandfathering). Finally, Groenenberg and Blok (2002) outline an initial allocation mechanism for a permit market that bases distribution on benchmarking the production process of each …rm and …nd it eliminates a large amount of problems associated with existing allocation mechanisms.
For a number of decades the free allocation (grandfathering) of permits has been discussed as a feasible method of allocation (e.g. Tietenberg, 1985) . Indeed, the majority of actual emissions trading schemes to date use grandfathering as the primary allocation mechanism due to its political viability: market participants will always lobby for the free allocation of permits (Stavins 1998) . Grandfathering might also be seen as o¤ering a closer …t to existing regulatory approaches, since it does not involve any fundamental change in property rights compared with, for instance, a system of performance standards for polluting emissions. Grandfathering might also be preferred by governments on competition grounds, since the avoidance of a lump-sum distribution from industry to government can avoid disadvantaging domestic …rms relative to their international competitors. On the negative side, grandfathering could be seen as rewarding …rms who have engaged in relatively low pollution control e¤orts in the past. As grandfathering is a commonly used tool, the discussions regarding the e¤ects of the mechanism have been widespread. In particular, Requate and Unold (2003) have shown that substantial innovation incentives exist for …rms in a grandfathered emissions scheme. However, Goulder et al. (1997) found grandfathering to be a rather ine¢ cient allocation mechanism compared to alternative allocation procedures. Recently, grandfathering has been adapted to include a dynamic element (Bode, 2006; Böhringer and Lange, 2005) . In particular, Böhringer and Lange (2005) have discussed updated grandfathering which continually updates the free allocation of permits based on historical emissions and output. 2 They found that the dynamic allocation has to be carefully considered to reduce distortions in the product and permit market.
Another important aspect of the mechanisms in question involves multi-period choice problems in pollution permit markets. Several studies have focused on general design considerations for multi-period permit markets (Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Rubin, 1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997; Schennach, 2000; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Yates and Cronshaw, 2001 ), yet only a few studies have focused on the initial allocation of permits in this setting. In the context of the electricity sector, Bode (2006) …nds considerable variation in the distributional impacts among di¤erent allocation mechanisms within a dynamic emissions trading scheme. Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) model a number of allocation mechanisms in a dynamic setting and …nd that welfare and employment vary drastically across allocation mechanisms.
The work which is the most relevant to our paper is by Böhringer and Lange (2005) , who compare the e¢ ciency of dynamic permit allocations based on output, emissions and a lump-sum transfer. In comparing e¢ ciency, they make a distinction between markets that are open (i.e. when …rms can trade outside the domestic market) and closed (i.e. when participating …rms cannot trade in permits outside the domestic market). This distinction is important to policy analysis as tradable permit markets are becoming increasingly varied in size and scope and have the potential to have either an open or closed market structure. They …nd in a closed market it is optimal to allocate permits on criteria not related to output, whereas for an open market, an e¢ cient allocation occurs when the permits are distributed using a lump-sum approach.
However, in their treatment of the initial allocation mechanism, Böhringer and Lange (2005) assume that the permit distribution to a …rm is based only on …rms'absolute levels of output and emissions, so that other …rms's actions do not a¤ect the allocation of a given …rm. Yet, given the …xed emission cap considered by Böhringer and Lange (2005) , the permit allocation to a …rm is also crucially dependent on the behaviour of rival …rms. This is because a …xed emissions cap implies that if in the current period rival …rms, say, increase their output and emissions relative to a given …rm, then the current-period aggregate output and emissions increase, thus decreasing the proportion of future permits that each …rm can receive per each unit of current output and emissions. As the result, even if a given …rm does not alter its own choices, its own future allocation of permits will change. Thus we argue that the initial allocation process considered by Böhringer and Lange (2005) should take into account other …rms' actions and thus should be modelled as a relative performance mechanism.
Our paper therefore attempts to extend Böhringer and Lange (2005) by implementing a more general design of a dynamic initial allocation mechanism, which allows for the allocation of permits to be based on each …rm's choices relative to other …rms. Fol-lowing Böhringer and Lange (2005) , we consider allocation mechanisms which are based on choices of output and emissions, but in addition we consider possible permit allocations based on an "external"factor which is independent of output and emissions. This allows us to create an encompassing model for most existing types of initial allocation mechanisms such as grandfathering, auctioning and contests. We show that a RPM can e¢ ciently (socially optimally) allocate pollution permits if the criteria used to compare …rms is based on such an external factor, in a contest. Given the variety of potential external factors, we suggest a number of criteria that a regulator may take into account when choosing a suitable factor. We also argue in favour of a new mechanism, which involves an inter-…rm contest designed to achieve two goals simultaneously -that is, the primary goal of e¢ ciency and some secondary goal, such as generating revenue, achieving health and safety targets, noise reduction, reduction of other pollutants, etc.
Given the political economy problems with both auctions and grandfathering as a way of initially allocating permits, this new mechanism may well be of interest to policy makers.
Our contribution is thus two-fold. First, we extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005) to a wider class of mechanisms, so-called relative performance mechanisms, such as grandfathering with …xed cap, yardsticks, auctions, contests, etc. Although such mechanisms create a situation where …rms'choices are interdependent, the general intuition of Böhringer and Lange (2005) holds in the Nash equilibrium of the ensuing game. That is, for a wide range of mechanisms, for the initial allocation to be cost-e¢ cient, it should not depend on …rms'outputs, and may depend on …rms'emissions only in limited circumstances. Second, we propose that the lump-sum distribution advocated by Böhringer and Lange (2005) can be implemented better a relative performance mechanism based on an external factor. Such a cost-e¢ cient mechanism allows the regulator to achieve a secondary target, such as raising revenue, -thus "killing two birds with one stone".
To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to introduce a generalised RPM into a permit market which allows us to model most existing relative-based mechanisms and has the added advantage of encompassing APMs. The paper is organised as follows:
section 2 outlines our model and presents the social optimality conditions and …rm's optimisation problem. A socially optimal dynamic initial allocation mechanism, when the market experiences both exogenous and endogenous permit prices, is considered in section 3. Section 4 discusses the external factor, while section 5 concludes.
The Model
We follow Böhringer and Lange (2005) and consider a multi-period partial equilibrium model. The technology of a …rm i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) at time t (t = 1; 2; : : :) is given by a cost function c it (e it ; q it ), where q it is the …rm's output level, and e it the …rm's emissions resulting from production. Costs c it are assumed to be twice di¤erentiable and convex,
The …rm sells its output in a competitive product market at a price of p t . Finally, the …rm is regulated by a competitive emissions-trading program and receives an initial allocation of permits A it .
We further assume that each …rm i also "produces" a factor z it which has no direct relevance in the product and emissions market, and thus is outside the regulator's interests and/or jurisdiction. This "external" factor is "produced" by each …rm independently of output and emissions at a cost v it (z it ) (possibly zero), with dv it dz it 0. While this external factor is irrelevant to the product and emissions market, it may determine …rms'permit allocations A it in a manner to be speci…ed later.
The Generalised Allocation Mechanism
Böhringer and Lange (2005) considered a mechanism whereby pollution permits are allocated based on the levels of …rm's historical production q it and emissions e it . 3 We …rst extend this mechanism by assuming that in addition to output and emissions, some "external"factor may play a role in how many permits will be allocated to a given …rm, but this factor has no relevance to the product and emissions market, and thus is beyond the interest or jurisdiction of the regulator (and it is this factor which determines the lump-sum allocations in the model of Böhringer and Lange, 2005) .
Examples of a possible external factor include population size in a …rm's locality, a …rm's socially responsible activities, a …rm's emissions of other pollutants, a random event such a lottery draw and so on. We denote such external factors as z it . While we will discuss the external factor more in section 4, it is worth noting here that the nature of the external factor determines both the cost of this factor to the …rm, as well as the degree of …rm's control over this factor. For example, population size is both beyond the …rm's control and it is "free" to the …rm. On the other hand, lottery tickets can be bought by …rms, or can be allocated to …rms by the regulator (and thus are beyond …rms'control). In contrast, in a permit auction, both success and costs of each …rm's bid depends on the bids of other participating …rms.
Thus, the allocation mechanism based on absolute performance (APM) is given by
whereh;g;f are increasing and continuously di¤erentiable functions, and t 1 q;it , t 1 e;it , t 1 z;it 0 are the weights (in period t) placed on period t 1's performance. The weights re ‡ect the relative importance of a particular activity, and can vary across time periods and across …rms.
We extend equation (1) by allowing for …rms'performance to be evaluated in comparison to other …rms, i.e. how a given …rm i's performance at time t in production q it , emissions e it , an external factor z it compares relatively to the performance of every other …rm i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i + 1; : : : ; ng. Formally, …rm i's performance at time t in output relatively to other …rms'output q it is given by a relative performance function h = h(q i(t 1) ; q i(t 1) ). Similarly, relative performance in emissions and external factor are given by g = g(e i(t 1); e i(t 1) ), and f = f (z i(t 1); z i(t 1) ), respectively. We assume h i = @h @q it , g i = @g @e it , f i = @f @z it > 0 so that, for given levels of other …rms'performance, higher levels of emissions, output, and the external factor result in a larger permit allocation. We also assume that h i = @h @q it , g i = @g @e it , f i = @f @z it 0, so that for a given level of …rm's performance, its allocation does not increases if other …rms'increase their levels of emissions, output, or the external factor. 4
We take a rather general view of the relative allocation functions. That is, to allow for uncertainty over allocations, we treat these functions as expectations over possi- 
Another example of a continuous relative allocation function includes Tullock-type (winner takes all) contest allocations, where a …rm's expected amount of permits is given by all participating …rms'outputs as fol-
. the size of the permit lot multiplied by the probability of winning the contest (see Skaperdas, 1996) .
Thus, the permit allocation for …rm i at time t, according to the generalized Relative Performance Mechanism is
Comparing this relative performance allocation mechanism to that based on absolute performance (1), one can observe the following:
Remark 1 If h i g i f i 0 then a relative performance allocation mechanism reduces to an absolute performance allocation mechanism.
In other words, the absolute performance mechanism considered by Böhringer and
Lange (2005) is a special case of relative performance mechanism when …rm i's allocation is independent of the remaining …rms'actions. In this case, the remaining …rms'actions have no impact on …rm i's allocation, and a …rm i can obtain permits by optimally choosing q it , e it and z it , without considering other …rms'actions.
Note that Böhringer and Lange (2005) implicitly assume that the grandfathering mechanism is an absolute performance mechanism. However, with a …xed emission cap, for a given behaviour of other …rms, if a particular …rm increases/decreases its output and/or emissions, that would a¤ect the aggregate output and emissions of domestic …rms, ultimately a¤ecting how many permits both that …rm and all other …rms will receive. Thus, it is implicit in Böhringer and Lange (2005) that the factor weights will change each period to re ‡ect changes in the aggregate activities. To see this, suppose that at time t a …xed amount of permits E t is allocated among n …rms proportionally to each …rm's output q it . In other words, each …rm i receives an allocation t q it , where
Thus, the output weight t has to be adjusted each period to re ‡ect changes in aggregate production. It is easy to see that such a …xed cap grandfathering mechanism is a RPM with h(q i(t 1) ; q i(t 1) ) = E t q it q it + P i q it . When a relative performance mechanism is used, …rm i's choices a¤ect the number of permits allocated to …rm j 6 = i, and thus a¤ect …rm j's pro…ts, and vice versa. In other words, a RPM creates a situation where …rms choices are interdependent. In such a situation, a rational …rm will make its choices strategically, by taking into account the anticipated actions of its rivals. The relative performance permit allocation mechanism thus results in a game among participating …rms, which leads …rms'behaviour to be typically di¤erent from their behaviour when faced with an APM. To explore the distortionary e¤ect of such behaviour, we …rst need to consider the socially optimal situation.
The Socially Optimal Outcome
We now consider the regulator's point of view. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005) we assume that the regulator cares about pro…ts and costs associated with the production of output and emissions of the speci…c pollutant, as well as the trade in the pollution permits, but is not interested in the external factors such as population size, lottery draws, or auction bids (we will come back to this assumption in Section 4). Thus, the regulator's objective is to maximise (minimise) the aggregate pro…t (cost) that all the domestic …rms incur while producing the product of the regulator's interests or In such a system, the regulator's objective takes into account the balance of the trade in the emission permits. Thus, given the set of prices ( t ; p it ), the regulator's objective is to M ax
where t is the exogenous permit price determined by the (international) demand and supply of permits in the open market and E t is the domestic emissions cap at time t.
For each …rm i and each of it's rival i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i + 1; : : : ; ng, the socially optimal conditions are as follows: 6
for all i; j 6 = i; t. That is, at period t all …rms will simultaneously equate their marginal production costs to their …rm-speci…c product price (4). Also, in the equilibrium, …rms'
marginal abatement costs will be equalized (5), and will be equal to the (exogenously determined) common permit price.
In contrast, in a closed emissions trading system, a single regulator distributes the total supply of permits, and thus ensures that the aggregate emissions are capped:
The emissions permit price is endogenously determined by the (domestic) demand and supply in the closed market. The regulators objective function is thus:
The socially optimal conditions are identical to the conditions (4-5), except that …rms'
marginal abatement costs will be equal to the shadow price of abatement.
Firm Optimisation
We …rst extended the allocation model of Böhringer and Lange (2005) by allowing for evaluations based on an independent external factor such as population size, socially responsible activities, emissions of other pollutants, lottery draw, and so on. We now focus our attention on the …rm-speci…c problem. Given the pro…le of other …rms'actions, the set of prices ( t ; p it ), and its permit allocation A it for the target pollutant, a …rm i will choose a level of emissions, output and an external factor, (q it; , e it; , z it ) to maximise its total stream of pro…ts:
Thus, when a relative performance mechanism (2) is used to allocate pollution permits, …rm i's objective function is:
For each …rm i and its rivals i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i + 1; : : : ; ng, the optimal choices are determined by the …rst order conditions as follows:
Similarly to the absolute performance allocation mechanism of Böhringer and Lange (2005), when a …rm's current output and emissions determine its future allocation of permits (and thus its pro…ts), each …rm will take this intertemporal e¤ect into account. 7
Thus, relative to the socially optimal conditions (4) and (5), a mechanism which uses past performance in output and emissions will generate an intertemporal distortion of …rms'incentives.
Importantly, this holds both for the absolute performance mechanism (1) but also for the relative performance mechanism (2). To see that, compare equations (7) to (4), as well as (8) to (5). Given that g i and h i are both positive, such a mechanism creates an implicit incentive to increase production and emissions beyond socially optimal levels. 8
Because the external factor z is outside the interests or jurisdiction of the social planner, it does not distort incentives when either a relative or absolute performance mechanism is used (9). For a given pro…le of other …rms' actions, …rm i chooses external factor z it , optimally, so that the marginal cost of obtaining the factor equals the marginal future bene…t obtained from the permit allocation. In summary, we have the following generalization of the intuition of Böhringer and Lange (2005):
Remark 2 When …rms' permit allocations are at least partially determined by output and emissions, all permit allocation mechanisms of the general form (2) create distortionary incentives in the product and permit markets.
As we noted above, the absolute performance mechanism (1) is a special case of the relative performance mechanism (2). Thus, any mechanism that allocates permits based on historical output and/or emissions will distort …rm's incentives to produce output and emissions optimally. Not only would the distortions occur when the adjustable cap grandfathering scheme (which is an APM) is used, but also any other scheme which utilizes …rms'relative performance with respect to each other in output and/or emissions.
This problem, of increased output and emissions, is associated with the "ratchet e¤ect"-using current performance to determine future targets and future initial allocations (Weitzman, 1980; Freixas et al., 1985; Bergland et al., 2002) . If a …rm decided not to increase emissions (output) then their permit allocation would be "ratcheted" down, as their emissions (output) would be relatively lower than all other …rms. If such a system was implemented, …rms that actively lowered emissions (output) would be implicitly punished. Therefore, each …rm has an incentive to increase its relative emissions (output) to stop their future permit allocation from being lowered. Thus, both RPMs and APMs will create distortions in the output and permits market when the criteria used to allocate permits is based on historical output and/or emissions information.
However, RPMs possess an additional important feature that APMs do not, namely, that a RPM results in a game among participating …rms. This is because when each …rm is evaluated relatively to other …rms, …rms' actions become interdependent. In the Nash equilibrium of this game, each …rm chooses a pro…le (q it ; e it ; z it ) according to equations (7)- (9) given the equilibrium beliefs about other …rms'choices.
Socially Optimal Allocation Mechanisms
In the last section we examined the ine¢ ciencies caused by a generalised relative performance mechanism where the criteria used to allocate permits were based on historical output, emissions, and an external factor. In this section we will extend the argument of Böhringer and Lange (2005) 
Open System
Recall that in a (small) open permit trading system, the aggregate supply of permits is determined jointly by the domestic allocation of permits and by the allocations of permits to all other foreign participants. Thus, the permit price is determined exogenously. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005) , the market equilibrium outcome (8), can be transformed into the socially optimal outcome (5), by implementing the su¢ cient condition t e;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. Similarly, one can ensure that the individually optimal production level (7) corresponds to the socially optimal production level (4), by setting t q;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. This leads us to the following:
Proposition 1 In a (small) open trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor z it only. That is, an optimal mechanism involves setting t 1 q;it t 1 e;it 0, for all i; t in the allocation equation (2):
That is, in open trading systems, to achieve the socially optimal outcome, a regulator should place a zero weight for historical output and emissions, and design a system that is based solely on …rms'performance in an external factor, which is not related to the output and emissions choice variables. By restricting allocation to variables that do not a¤ect the permit and product market, the …rms' incentives remain undistorted.
This occurs because using an external factor breaks the intertemporal link between the permit rent (output subsidy) and the incentive to alter the choice variables. Our results agree with the commonly held view that one can obtain a socially optimal outcome by distributing permits based on an external factor (Goulder et al., 1997; Cramton and Kerr, 2002) . Because an absolute performance mechanism is a special case of relative performance mechanism, the above result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Proposition 2). That is, if the allocation function for each …rm i is independent of rivals'actions, it is socially optimal to use historical external factor to allocate permits.
Closed System
We now consider an emissions program where the permit price is endogenously determined by the demand and supply in a closed permit market. This includes a conventional closed market system where the sole supply of permits originates from one regulator and where the permit price is determined by the aggregate level of emissions in the emissions program.
Comparing equations (4) with (7) and equations (5) with (8) one can obtain the following socially optimal conditions for output and emissions: t q;i(t+1) h i (q it; q it ) = 0 (11) t e;i(t+1) g i (e it; e it ) = t e;j(t+1) g j (e jt; e jt ) (12) 8i, j 6 = i and i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i + 1; : : : ; ng.
Similar to the exogenous case, equation (11) suggests that to achieve social optimality, the marginal bene…t to …rm i from increasing output should be equal to zero.
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for achieving social optimum involves the regulator placing a zero weight on each …rm's historical output:
In contrast, equation (12) suggests that the marginal permit allocation should be equal across …rms. This condition is di¢ cult to ensure for all …rms and for all functional forms of g. We could …nd only one set of su¢ cient conditions for social optimality in emissions which holds for all functional forms of g, which is similar to the su¢ cient conditions for output: t e;i(t+1) = 0 8 i; t (14) that is, the regulator should put a zero weight on each …rm's historical emissions choices.
These conditions not only ensure social optimality for any relative (and thus absolute) performance mechanism, but also requires less problem solving by the regulator and participating …rms.
Instead, if a non-zero weight for historical emissions choices is selected then only a narrow class of RPMs satisfy the social optimality condition (12). In other words, only RPMs that create an identical marginal allocation can obtain a socially optimal
outcome. An example of such mechanism is a yardstick mechanism that allocates permits to each …rm based on how its historical emissions compare to the other …rms' average historical emissions e.g. g(e it ; e it ) = 1 t e;i(t+1) E t+1 n + t e it P i e it n 1 for all i and t (as well as its "absolute"counterpart g(e it ) = t t e;i(t+1) e it ). Obviously, equating emissions "weights" e;it across …rms makes the problem easier.
Thus, any RPM with identical marginal allocations across …rms can socially optimally allocate permits based on …rms'relative performances with respect to historical emissions and an external factor. Our results agree with Böhringer and Lange (2005) who were able to prove that the optimality result holds for a linear APM. Therefore, RPMs and APMs that have identical marginal allocations across …rms can obtain a socially optimal outcome. Thus, it follows from inspection of equations (11) and (12) that:
Proposition 2 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor z it as well as using suitably chosen relative performance schemes in historical emissions, and ignoring …rms' historical outputs, i.e. t 1 q;it 0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation equation (2) becomes:
A it = t 1 e;it g(e i(t 1) ; e i(t 1) ) + t 1 z;it f (z i(t 1) ; z i(t 1) )
where functions g are chosen such that condition (12) is satis…ed.
Again, because absolute performance mechanisms are a special case of relative performance mechanism, the above result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Proposition 1). Importantly, one can achieve social optimality in the closed system by using the same permit allocation scheme as in the open system:
Corollary 1 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor z it only, i.e. 0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation equation (2) becomes:
In other words, regardless of the nature trading system, one can implement the socially optimal permit allocation mechanism based on the relative performance in the external factor. Thus, the external factor plays a key role in optimal permit allocation scheme, calling for further issues to be considered by the allocation mechanism designer.
The External Factor
We argued in the previous section that one can achieve social optimality in the product and target pollutant markets by using …rms' relative performance with respect to an external factor to allocate target pollution permits. In this section, we will describe the external factor, possible mechanisms based on relative performance in this external factor, as well as the bene…ts of this approach.
Criteria for the Choice of an External Factor
We de…ne the external factor as anything which has no direct relevance to the product and target pollutant emissions markets, and which is thus beyond the interest or jurisdiction of the regulator. Examples of possible external factor include population size in …rm's locality, …rm's socially responsible activities, …rm's emissions of other pollutants, a random event such a lottery draw, and so on. Since the external factor can take a variety of forms, the regulator faces a choice of a suitable external factor. However, there is number of issues involved in the external factor choice.
Independence: To achieve social optimality, the "production"of the external factor has to be independent of …rms' output and emissions of the target pollutant. Obviously, if the external factor is correlated with …rm's output and/or emissions, …rms'incentives will be distorted, and social optimality will not be achieved.
Ease of use:
As the main objective of the regulator is to minimise the aggregate cost of the emissions program, a desirable external factor should be easy for the regulator to observe.
Reward of E¤ort:
The regulator may choose the external factor to reward …rms'e¤orts. When heterogeneity of …rms'is substantial, the external factor may take a form of "intensity", or within-…rm relative assessment -for example, proportion of …rm's community activities relatively to the size of locality.
Equal Opportunity: The regulator may wish to ensure that all …rms have equal opportunity to obtain permit allocations, and thus that the external factor can be produced by every participating …rm. When the regulated …rms believe they are being treated "fairly"in a sense of equality of opportunity, then the emissions program may have a higher chance of success.
Political Acceptability of the External Factor: The success of the allocation scheme may depend on political acceptability of the external factor by the regulated …rms and regulator (as well as possibly by the general public).
Fair Allocations: As psychologists suggest, judgments of allocative fairness are a¤ected by the relative merits of the recipients, thus suggesting that relative performance mechanisms may be perceived to be "fair"as long as the external factor is considered to be meritorious. 9
Double Dividend: Of particular interest may be those external factors where the marginal bene…ts will typically exceed the marginal social costs. In other words, the external factor may be chosen so that it confers some additional bene…t to the regulator other than the control of emissions. The regulator could de…ne a costly z it in such a way as it would prefer to observe higher (or lower) values.
As the last three of these issues may be of particular interest to mechanism designers, we will discuss them in detail.
A Non-Monetary External Factor
As it was mentioned above, one of the possible reasons why regulators avoid allocating permits based on …rms performance in external "monetary"factor -such as auction bids -is that it is politically unpopular. We thus suggest that perhaps a mechanism that is based on relative performance in a non-monetary external factor, may have a better political acceptability, in particular if they involve a possibility of social betterment.
When a non-monetary external factor is chosen as a basis for permit allocations, there are no direct …nancial transfers. Firms instead are rewarded for the (non-monetary) actions they choose. This reasoning is very similar to the arguments that advocate a grandfathering system rather than an auction (Stavins, 1998) . However, as we showed above, grandfathering schemes involving historically updated outputs and emissions are
distortive. Yet we suggest that a regulator can choose a non-monetary external factor that is agreeable for …rms (or at least less controversial than other criteria).
There is a variety of possible non-monetary external factors. Charitable activities such as support of improvements in education and health infrastructure in the local community may be viable. This may prove to be a meritorious allocation process; …rms are given the "right"to pollute based on the degree of their social responsibilities within a community. Another set of alternative external factors may be of particular relevance to environmental regulator. These may include reduction of an external "basket" of environmental pollutants or environmental indicators, for example noise pollution, or investments in energy e¢ ciency. That is, …rms could be allocated permits for the target pollutant based on their reduction of completely separate and independent pollutants.
However, we have to emphasize again that, to achieve social optimality in output and emissions markets, a potential non-monetary external factor z it has to be independent from the …rm's emissions and output choices. Thus special care has to be taken in regulator's choice of non-target pollutants as external factors as emissions of some pollutants can be correlated with emissions of the target pollutant, leading to potential ine¢ ciencies in target pollutant emissions market.
The Regulator' s Secondary Objective
As we mentioned above, there may exist external factors which are irrelevant to the product and target pollutant emissions market, but nevertheless the regulator may be interested in …rms engaging in production of this external factor. If this is the case, the regulator may have a primary objective of controlling emissions at lowest social cost, as well as a secondary objective of increasing the aggregate amount of the external factor, or its net bene…ts.
One obvious example of multiple regulatory objectives is the "double dividend" argument for the use of auctions for permit allocations. As Cramton and Kerr (2002, p.335) suggest, a permit auction can raise revenue whilst enforcing emissions control.
This revenue can be used to reduce distortionary taxes in the economy (e.g. Parry, 1997) or reduce the burden on auction participants through a revenue neutral auction (Hahn and Noll, 1982; Hahn, 1988) .
Alternatively, there can be two (non-competing) regulators with di¤erent objectives.
For example, the energy (electricity) industry may be required to participate in an emissions program whilst simultaneously being overseen by social/public policy regulator to promote …rms'anti-discriminatory personnel policies. The environmental policy regulator aims to control aggregate emissions at the lowest possible cost and is not concerned about the size or cost of the external factor in any way. The second regulator is possibly a social/public policy regulator who's aim is to maximise the aggregate external factor produced by the participating …rms. Another example of a double objective may be the regulation of two environmental targets, with one target being controlled by target pollutant permit market, and another target currently being unregulated -for example, emissions of CO 2 and a basket of other greenhouse gases. In any case, the secondary objective involves maximization of …rms'aggregate activities, expenditures, or e¤orts (for a similar objective see for example Moldovanu and Sela, 2001 ).
As we argued above, one can achieve the socially optimal outcome in product and target pollutant markets by allocating permits using an external factor only. Therefore, using such an approach simultaneously achieves the primary target of socially optimal outcome in the two markets and a secondary target of maximisation of the aggregate external factor. Formally, let 2 (0; 1] represent the relative importance of the primary target (emissions control), and let us consider (small) open system (the argument for the closed system will be only slightly di¤erent). In this case, the "combined" regulatory objective is:
The …rst order conditions for emissions and output are identical to the socially optimal equations (4) and (5). Moreover, this combined regulatory objective allows for …rms'individually optimal choice of the external factor. It follows from inspection of equations (7)-(9) and (17) that:
Remark 3 If a RPM is used to allocate permits based on a costly external factor then a secondary (regulatory) target can be achieved whilst still achieving the socially optimal outcome with respect to the target pollutant.
In other words, by allocating target pollutant permits among …rms based on their relative performance in a suitably chosen external factor, a regulator can "kill two birds with one stone" by achieving emission control at the lowest social cost in output and permit markets, and maximizing aggregate production of a socially bene…cial external factor.
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the impact and optimality of implementing a generalised (dynamic) relative performance mechanism for the initial allocation of pollution permits. We extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005) to accommodate most of the existing dynamic initial allocation mechanisms, including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms, such as rank-order contests. We show that using …rms'historical outputs for allocating permits is never optimal, while using …rms' historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions.
We outline su¢ cient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism and discuss the issues related to the choice of a suitable mechanism for initial allocation.
Due to these potential bene…ts, we advocate using a relative performance mechanism with an external factor for the dynamic allocation of permits. The numerous advantages of using a relative performance mechanism include its adaptability to changing economic, technological, and other conditions, as well as a possibility of transferring risk of possible systemic shocks (such as oil price changes) to the regulator. The advantage of using an external factor involves a possibility of achieving secondary regulatory goals, such as revenue maximization, social betterment or reduction in other environmental problems. Moreover, if the secondary goal is political agreeable, the permit trading scheme may also enjoy greater public acceptance.
Allocating permits for a target pollutant based on …rms' relative performance in external factor increases …rms' ‡exibility in meeting both regulatory goals by choosing the most cost-e¤ective approach. That is, …rm's cost-e¤ective behaviour may depend on whether it has comparative advantage in abatement of the target pollutant, or in the production of the external factor. We think that such potential asymmetries among …rms are important for the optimal design of permit allocation schemes, a topic of potential future research.
We also propose a novel allocation mechanism involving a rank-order contest, which is a generalization of an all-pay auction. In an external factor rank-order contest, …rms are ranked in the order of their relative production of the external factor, and it is …rm's rank, and not the level of the external factor, that determines …rm's permit allocation. As the theoretical literature suggests, an allocation scheme with a suitably chosen "prize"structure is expected to achieve the secondary goal of maximizing aggregate production of the external factor -the goal which may not be achievable with other allocation mechanisms. In other words, by allocating target pollutant permits among …rms using a rank-order contest in socially desirable activities (including abatement of unregulated greenhouse gases or even charitable activities) a regulator can "kill two birds with one stone"by achieving emission control at the lowest social cost in output and permit markets, and maximizing aggregate amount of a socially bene…cial activity.
The external factor rank-order contest has some advantages over the presently used grandfathering scheme. While regulators seem to prefer grandfathering due to its political agreeability among the regulated …rms, these schemes can be unpopular with the general public. In contrast, an external factor contest not only has a potential of achieving social optimality, but also it achieves a secondary regulatory goal (which may be perceived as achieving "fairness"), while the grandfathering scheme involving historical output and emissions achieves none of these two goals.
While we have presented arguments in favour of using RPMs based on an external factor in allocating permits, we nevertheless appreciate the potential practical di¢ culties involving in the choice of a suitable external factor. The success of the trading scheme rests on the regulator's ability to …nd an external factor that is desirable, politically agreeable, independent from output and emissions, and allows for an adequate comparison between …rms. We nevertheless hope that the arguments presented in this paper may be of relevance to the environmental policy makers.
